The History of the Eurodollar Market in the 1960s

Written by admin on May 18th, 2011

the Euro-markets, and US resident funds was attracted, because of the higher interest rates paid on such deposits in these markets than in the USA. The effective floor to the deposit rate on Euro-dollars is determined for non-residents by rates paid by US banks on foreign time deposits and other comparable short-term investments in the United States. In 1961, the Euro-dollar rate in London averaged 3.58% compwasd with 2.35% on new issues of US Treasury Bills and 2.80% on prime bankers’ acceptances. In 1962, the Euro-dollar rate averaged 3.77% compared with 2.78% on US treasury bills and 3.01% on bankers’ acceptances .

The higher interest rate of dollar deposits in Europe was not the only “cost” factor determining the attraction of holding such deposits. The most favourable condition for non-American owned dollars was that the dollar exchange rate (spot) should be on the floor but that there should be no expectation of imminent dollar devaluation either in terms of foreign currencies or gold. European dollar holders did not then need exchange cover. If fears of a dollar devaluation become widespread, the supply of non-American dollars would tend to dry up as banks would sell their dollars to the central authorities which would convert into gold. If the dollar rose to the top of the range against European currencies, the possible 2% fall over three months could militate heavily against Europeans continuing to hold and lend dollars, although it would not of course affect deposits attracted from American residents.

European banks were willing to pay higher rates on dollar deposits than American banks because they could find a profitable use for them. The dollars were used in the following ways: without switching into another currency; with switching but without forward cover; and with switching and with forward cover. Any of these possibilities could lead to investment, which more than covered the deposit charge which led to a demand for Euro-dollars. The banks holding the dollar deposits lent to governments by investing in government debt instruments and to commercial borrowers. The amount of borrowing by the banks to take advantage of pure interest arbitrage was a factor, although not the major one, determining the demand for Euro-dollars. Rates on Euro-dollars had been consistently too high to permit covered arbitrage in UK Treasury Bills, but when confidence in sterling was high there has been uncovered arbitrage. However, the rates on UK local authority and finance house deposits have been high enough to enable covered arbitrage transactions to take place at times. This process was usually short lived as the process of switching on any large scale removes the arbitrage advantage.

Most of the demand for Euro-dollars came from businesses and commercial enterprises. As, the dollars may have been needed to finance export-import operations. Commercial banks may use the dollars to serve as a money market instrument. A bank that temporarily needs additional liquidity may accept dollars (or other foreign currency deposits) instead of discounting with its central bank or selling assets in the open market. Moreover, since deposits can be accepted or placed in a wide range of maturities, banks can use then very flexibly. Likewise, businesses may be in temporary need of liquidity or may need dollars to finance overseas investments. For blue-chip industrial and commercial customers the rates that they will pay for borrowing from the market will range upwards from 5½% (i.e. from prime borrowing rate in the New York market). The maximum rate that can be charged in the Euro-market is the rate that the customers would have to pay in their domestic market. As the banks will be paying in the region of 3½% – 4½% for Euro-deposits, their maximum “turn” will be in the region of 1%-2% .

Switching out of dollars into European currencies can be profitable either for the Euro-banker direct or for the borrower who wants to finance in his own currency. In such a case the limit to such an operation would be where the cost of switching into the domestic currency and covering the transaction forward equalled the cost of securing funds on the domestic market. However, the business of switching is best regarded as a specialised concern operating in certain favourable times, but not essential to the functioning of the Euro-dollar market.

The growth of the Euro-dollar market has been basically the result of the difference in the interest rate structure of New York and European centres. Interest rates had been lower in the USA than in Europe and the deficit on trade and long-term capital accounts remained deposited in Europe rather than returning to New York, which had enabled European bankers to outbid New York for deposits (and deposit rates). Secondly, and of increasing concern to the American authorities, US residents have been attracted to the Euro-market, again because of higher rates, and this has added to the US capital outflow. Also, the widespread differences between borrowing and lending rates in New York and in most domestic capital markets had enabled the Euro-bankers to outbid their domestic counterparts for lending outlets by working on smaller margins, relying on a heavy volume of business to make their profit. The market had also been stimulated by certain non-interest rigidities in domestic markets, e.g. exchange control, credit squeezes etc.

The effect of the growth of this international currency had been: Firstly, to influence the structure and level of short-term rates in a number of countries. The Euro-market had tended to internationalise interest-arbitrage transactions. Secondly, to make it more difficult to carry out large changes of domestic monetary policy. Attempts to tighten liquidity would, by raising interest rates in the domestic market, lead to inflows of Euro-dollars. Thirdly to reduce the cost of foreign trade financing as the Euro-bankers have under-cut domestic charges.Finally, to increase the importance of the dollar as an international currency used in both trade and finance. As American non-residents were more willing to hold dollars because of the attractive interest rates to be obtained, international liquidity has been increased. The Euro-dollar market had been of help to the American balance of payments to the extent that non-residents have been willing to hold dollars instead of converting them into gold. However, higher deposit rates in the Euro-market had attracted US residents to invest in the market, and thus add to the US outflow. It had therefore been argued that it would be of advantage to the USA, if the latter could be reduced or eliminated without affecting the advantage to be gained by the former.

However, although the American authorities were concerned about the resident outflow resultant on the existence of the Euro-dollar market, there was evidence to suggest that the resident outflow was more than offset by a return flow of Euro-dollars back to the USA. Between December 1963 and March 1963, UK banks which were by far the biggest operators in the Euro-dollar market, increased their dollar claims on US residents by £147m while their US resident liabilities rose by only £4 million . These figures probably overstate the net inflow of dollars to the USA, as unknown quantity of resident funds reach the Euro-market via Canadian banks and were not picked up within the scope of these figures. Nevertheless, the amount of resident funds reaching the market was small and was probably offset by a substantial return flow. This return flow arose because of the wide-spread between the deposit and lending rates of US domestic banks which enabled European banks to outbid US banks for lending outlets in the US market. The existence of the Euro-dollar market certainly facilitated the lending by European banks to US residents.

American domestic banks were limited on the interest rates that they could pay on resident time deposits by “regulation Q”. The maximum interest rates payable varied between 1% on 30-day deposits to 4% on 360-day deposits . As a result, when they were short of funds, they often encouraged their European subsidiaries to enter into the Euro-dollar market and bid for dollars, the subsidiary then repatriated the dollars to its head office in America. To the extent that the European subsidiary attracted US resident deposits, this was a roundabout way of the US bank offering American residents a deposit rate in excess of that permitted by Regulation Q. The Euro-dollar market would cease to grow when rates in New York and in Europe for lending and borrowing were exactly aligned for all types of customers and when the differential between the lending and borrowing rates was small enough to make any banking operations unprofitable. Even if such conditions held, the dollars outstanding would still continue to be utilised for arbitrage operations and so there will always be some scope for Euro-dollar operations.

When the Euro-dollar market would be naturally curtailed, there were attempts to restrict the operations of the market in the following ways: The rate of interest charged on dollar loans was artificially increased. Italy is the clearest example of this. Agreements by Italian banks covering minimum rates on loans in lire were supplemented in 1961 by minimum rates on dollars and other foreign currencies. This agreement has been continually revised. Secondly, under the stress of competition, it was agreed or understood by banks in some countries (e.g. Germany) that loans in foreign currency should be made only to the foreign trade sector. Finally, in many European countries, the competitive effect of foreign loans was restricted by exchange or capital control regulations.

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