Anti Poverty

Written by admin on May 19th, 2011

their demands for recipients to work and reduced government obligations toward and funds to serve them (Danziger, 1999).


                     When Bush took office in 2001, the U.S. was experiencing a national surplus, unemployment and poverty had been on the decline for years, and the economy was booming. Now, almost six years later, poverty is on the rise, healthcare coverage is on the decline, and the country is faced with the largest national deficit in history. Lower middle class families are slowly slipping below the poverty line and the poorest are becoming even more destitute. Most of these families are headed by women.


                      President Bush has extended the TANF. There has been a general economic stimulus policy initiative during the Bush administration but nothing targeting low income Americans has been enacted. President Bush signed the economic stimulus package (H.R. 5140) into law with the hope that it will provide a much-needed boost to the lagging economy. The package includes tax rebates for individuals, tax breaks for businesses, and a temporary increase of the Federal Housing Administration loans from 7,000 to 9,750 (White House report, 2008). More than 130 million people are expected to get tax rebates ranging from 0 to ,200 per household for individuals earning ,000 or less and couples earning up to 0,000 (White House report, 2008). While the stimulus package will provide much needed financial help to millions of people, it fails to target those most in need as it will not include an extension of unemployment benefits, energy assistance, food stamp benefits, or fiscal relief to states for Medicaid.                       


                  From the above analysis, the question arises whether poor are responsible for their own condition. The above analysis implies that recipients become dependent and lethargic due to vast welfare measures. Scholars such as Murray (1984) and Kilty and Segal (2006) have emphasized on individual factors. They argue that welfare measures and lack of spirit and motivation among indigents contribute poverty. Danziger, 1999 argues that during the Nixon era increased welfare measures encouraged idleness. Kilty and Segal, 2006 also argues that poor people can come out into a state of self-sufficiency from dependency by learning proper work attitude and skills. Kilty and Segal, 2006 argue the importance of welfare reform and a ‘tough love’ approach would ultimately help the poor by making them conscious of their condition and forcing them to take their own responsibility. Bill Clinton’s emphasis on ‘personal responsibility’ and measures to ‘end welfare as we know it’ in 1992 all supports the above argument.


                     Due to the implementation of TANF, the numbers of people on welfare have decreased. As a result more funds are accumulated. In 1996 the number of ADFC recipients was 12,644,076 while in 2001, the number of TANF recipients was 5,91, 811 and the poverty rate also reduced from 13.7 to 11.3 ( Kilty and Segal, 2006) and while in 2008 it is 1,628,422  ( US Dept of Health and Human Services). The share of single mothers on welfare (based on administrative caseload counts divided by population numbers) rose from 38 percent in 1969 to 48 percent in 1980, but had fallen to 30 percent by 1998 ( Kilty and Segal, 2006). These caseload changes are widespread, with every state in the country experiencing substantial caseload decline. This decline has been widely hailed by politicians as an indication that policies designed to reduce dependence on public assistance and move less-skilled adults into the labor market have been extremely effective ( Blank, 2007). But however Blank argues that declines in welfare do not affect the poverty rate. The poverty rate in 2007 was 12.5 percent, increasing slightly from its level of 12.3 percent in 2006. The poverty rate increased for four straight years from 2000 to 2004. In 2007, the poverty rate was 1.2 percentage points higher than it was in 2000 (Blank, 2007).     

States welfare initiatives


                      Most states took a significant decision about reform, and this decision was sensible in light of state goals and experience. A few states did not seriously make reform policy. New York was so deeply divided that it took no serious decisions about AFDC (Mead, 2002). Alabama and Missouri were pushed into reform by federal action and appeared to have little welfare policy of their own (Mead, 2002). In several other Southern states (Florida, North Carolina), policymaking appeared to be casual and personalized, with the governor or legislators offering reform plans with, apparently, little inquiry or evidence behind them( Mead, 2002) . Texas policymaking was incoherent as the state claimed to pursue work first but based its policy on an experimental program and focused far more on education and training (Mead, 2002). States have always emphasized on reform. But sometimes lower contribution towards these plans result in total failure of the program. Mead (2002) argues that in Florida and Georgia, however, officialdom was dragged into reform but showed little commitment to it. In Arizona and California, the agency or major localities had been heavily committed to a skills-oriented approach to welfare and resisted the shift toward work first. In Texas, welfare reform was a lower priority to administrators than rebuilding non-welfare employment programs and other initiatives. In Colorado and New Jersey, local agencies had a history of defiance toward the state government, and this prevented them from fully endorsing reforms decided in the capital. Mead (2002) argues that inspite of establishment of Employment Service (ES), a federally-funded job placement agency, and training programs under the federal Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), poverty rate did not improve. After national welfare work programs were first enacted in 1967, the ES engaged in welfare practices. But because the ES’s routine stressed serving job seekers who came to it voluntarily, it generally performed poorly with welfare clients (Mead, 2002). These jobseekers came to it on a mandatory basis, as a condition of receiving aid. To succeed with them, the agency had to enforce work but also support employment with special services. The ES often found both these roles uncongenial (Mead, 2002). The ES was denoted to the role of contractor to welfare and later in 1988 the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) merged the ES, JTPA, and other non-welfare work programs. But this merging also created confusion. The problems included lack of clear procedures to refer clients to WIA, to serve them there, or to report results back to welfare. The states that lacked coordination and inadequate management information systems (MIS) were Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee.      


                         Colorado’s public reform has been associated with decline in poverty rate. By the close of 2000, Colorado’s unemployment rate dropped to 2.6 percent, personal income showed steady gains, state welfare cases declined dramatically, and State legislators wrestled with an estimated 3 million revenue surplus (Colorado Fiscal Policy Institute, 2001). But inspite of all the above facts poverty still persists as expenses like child care, out-of-pocket medical expenses and geo-graphic differences in housing costs increased. The increases occurred even after adjusting for income support such as tax relief, food stamps and school lunch programs, housing subsidies and energy assistance. A report published in 2001 by the Colorado Fiscal Policy Institute determined that a single parent with two small children living in Denver County would need to earn an annual salary of approximately ,924 in order to meet their basic needs such as housing, food, health care, childcare and transportation without public or private assistance. Even child poverty rate is high in Colorado. About 180,000 children, 15.7 percent of the state total was living in poverty in Colorado in 2006, a 73 percent increase since 2000 (Frosch, 2008). The state of Colorado purchases childcare for income eligible families through the Colorado Child Care Assistance Program (CCCAP). The state allows individual counties to set the purchase price of childcare and make payments to providers from a combination of parental fees and federal, state and county funds. However, the Colorado Office of Resource and Referral Agencies (CORRA) found in a 2001 study that the average county payment fell below 75 percent of market value (Colorado Fiscal Policy Institute, 2001, pp 9). As a result counties forced providers to subsidize the cost of service to low-income families, which many were simply unwilling to do when limited slots could be filled with families that could afford to pay full rates. Other providers that chose not to simply refuse service to CCCAP families saved money by limiting the number of children on CCCAP that they would accept, cutting programs, or reducing workers’ wages. All of these actions limited availability and sacrificed quality of care to low-income children. Poverty still exists in Colorado despite initiatives to alleviate poverty as too many working families lives with incomes below the poverty line and more families earn wages simply too low to afford their basic needs. The Colorado government started the Common Good Caucus in 2007 to develop a 2009 agenda, emphasizing on K-12 education and determined to bring technologies out of the laboratory and into the marketplace by investing .5

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